



## COLLABORATIVE LEARNING PROJECTS

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### DO NO HARM PROJECT: TRAINER'S MANUAL

### BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE DNH PROJECT

A Manual of the Do No Harm Project (Local Capacities for Peace Project)  
A project of the Collaborative for Development Action, Inc.  
and CDA Collaborative Learning Projects

*(revised November 2004)*

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## Timeline of the Do No Harm Project

- The Issue Identified: Assistance workers around the world identified an issue: how can we provide assistance in a conflict setting without exacerbating the conflict?

- **Phase I: Case Studies** (1994 - 1996)

15 case studies from 14 conflict zones; ranging from large international NGOs to small, local NGOs; dealing with different types of conflict, from “hot” war to post-conflict situations to situations of low-scale, but endemic social violence; asking the question in the context of relief and in the context of development.

Booklet produced: *Do No Harm* (called the “red and black” book)

- **Phase II: Feedback Workshops** (1996 - 1997)

23 feedback workshops, held in the field and in organization headquarters; over 100 organizations represented and over 400 assistance workers tested the lessons of the booklet. Other events were also used to solicit feedback. The total number of people involved in this phase was over 750.

Book produced: *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace—Or War* (called the “blue” book), with the final version of the Framework

- **Phase III: Implementation** (1997 - 2000)

12 organizations operating in conflict zones implemented the use of the Framework in program analysis, program design and redesign and program planning.

Book produced: *Options for Aid in Conflict* (called the “Options Manual”)

- **Phase IV: Mainstreaming** (2001 - present)

Many organizations are engaged in an ongoing process of learning through the dissemination of the Do No Harm principles and approach through workshops and wider implementation of the use of the Framework.

## Highlights of the Do No Harm Project

- In late 1994 the DNH Project was launched to answer the question: ***How may assistance be provided in conflict settings in ways that, rather than feeding into and exacerbating the conflict, help local people disengage from the violence that surrounds them and begin to develop alternative systems for addressing the problems that underlie the conflict?***
- The DNH Project is a collaborative effort, organized by the Collaborative for Development Action in Cambridge, Massachusetts, involving a number of donor agencies (DANIDA, Sida, CIDA, UNHCR, DHA, OCHA, German EED, Foreign Ministry of Norway, OFDA of USAID, DEZA with more being added all the time), international NGOs (over 100 of them) and local assistance workers.
- The approach taken by DNH was inductive, learning from local field experiences. Thus, fifteen case studies were conducted in fourteen conflict zones to examine the interactions of humanitarian and development assistance and conflict.
- From the cases, lessons-to-date were compiled in a booklet entitled ***Do No Harm: Supporting Local Capacities for Peace through Aid*** (published by CDA in 1996). This booklet represented the knowledge at that stage and it formed the basis for over twenty-five feedback workshops carried out with assistance workers in a number of countries in which practitioners “tested” the lessons against their own experience, added to and amended them and, thus, improved them. The learning from these efforts was published in a book entitled ***Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace—Or War***, (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Colorado, 1999).

*(The 1996 booklet is now outdated, it represented “work in progress” and the state of discussion at that stage. CDA no longer stands behind all the statements. The 1996 booklet should no longer be quoted or used in workshop!)*

- On the basis of the lessons learned from the case studies and the responses of more than 750 practitioners working in humanitarian relief and development assistance in areas affected by violent destructive conflict a planning tool – the “*Framework for Considering the Impact of Assistance on Conflict*” was developed. 12 organizations tested this planning tool over a period of up to three years in projects implemented in conflict areas. The learning from this testing phase are documented in the booklet ***Options For Aid in Conflict: Lessons from Field Experience*** (Mary B. Anderson (ed.), published by CDA, Cambridge 2000)
- The DNH Project continues to work with operational NGOs that are carrying out projects in conflict areas to apply the DNH lessons in “real time and space.” DNH staff and volunteers work with NGO field and headquarters staff to use the methods and approaches of DNH to analyze the interactions between their assistance programmes and the conflicts where they work and, then, to make appropriate adjustments to projects in order to ensure that assistance does not do harm but supports local efforts toward non-war existence.

## Case Studies: Phase I of the Do No Harm Project (the Issue Identified)

### Issue Papers

Mary Anderson initiated the Do No Harm Project with a series of four issue papers written in 1994 and 1995. In the first she outlined the issue of negative impacts of assistance in conflict zones. This paper served as the background for the beginning of the project. The subsequent three papers were brief examinations of the issues that began to be highlighted by the case studies.

1. **International Assistance and Conflict: An Exploration of Negative Impacts.** Mary B. Anderson, July 1994.
2. **The Experience of NGOs in Conflict Prevention: Problems and Prospects.** Mary B. Anderson, April 1995.
3. **Humanitarian NGOs in Conflict Intervention.** Mary B. Anderson, September 1995.
4. **Relationships Between Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict and Remedial Steps That Might Be Taken.** Mary B. Anderson, October 1995

### Case Studies

The project began in earnest with the writing of case studies. Fifteen case studies were written about fourteen conflict zones.

1. **The Harmony Project of the St. Xavier's Social Service Society, Ahmedabad, Gujarat, India.** Joseph Bock, January 1995.
2. **Reconciliation Across Borders: An Experiment in Croatia.** Larry Minear, January 1995.
3. **Trocaire Integrated Rehabilitation Program, Gedo, South-Western Somalia.** Stephen Jackson, January 1995.
4. **Food for Work for Rebuilding Homes in Khatlon Province, Tajikistan: A Project of Save the Children Federation.** Mary B. Anderson, January 1995.
5. **Norwegian Church Aid and Norwegian Refugee Council Afghanistan/Pakistan Project: A Case Study.** Mary B. Anderson, January 1995.
6. **International Assistance to Civilians: The Abkhaz-Georgian Civil War.** Kenny Gluck, March 1995.
7. **ICRC in Burundi: A Case Study.** Lena Sallin, June 1995.
8. **SAWA/Education for Peace: Uniting Lebanon's Children and Youth During War.** Greg Hansen, June 1995.
9. **Orangi Pilot Project: Research and Training Institute, Karachi.** Susan Lyke and Joseph Bock, September 1995.

10. **Save the Children Federation (USA) in Lower Shabelle (Somalia).** Willet Weeks, September 1995.
11. **Reintegration Efforts in a Post-War Context: The Activities of the Danish Refugee Council and the Norwegian Refugee Council in Mozambique.** Kate Halvorsen, September 1995.
12. **Reconciliation Within the Local Red Cross Through Functional Cooperation: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in Bosnia-Herzegovina.** Helene Holm-Pedersen, October 1995.
13. **Repatriation in Safety and Dignity? Reintegration and Rehabilitation Activities of the International Catholic Migration Committee in Cambodia.** Kate Halvorsen, October 1995.
14. **The Jerusalem Link: Women Joined Across Conflict.** Mary B. Anderson, August 1995.
15. **Blessed are the Spacemakers: Constructing Peace and Peace Processes in Conflictual Situations. A Case Study of Guatemala 1976-1996.** Tom Lent, March 1996.

## Feedback Workshops: Phase II of the Do No Harm Project

Twenty-three “official”, project sponsored feedback workshops were held. Several other events were also used to outline the issues and to gather feedback. Overall, over 750 practitioners from the field, from headquarters, and from donors were involved in the feedback workshop phase. The following list includes only the official feedback workshops.

1. **Monrovia, Liberia.** (w/SmartAid workshop)  
25-27 October 1996  
Sponsor: CARE International etc., LCPP  
Trainers: Willet Weeks, Kenny Gluck
2. **Southern Sudan (Nairobi)** 6-9 Jan. 1997  
Sponsor: USAID  
Trainer: Mary B. Anderson
3. **Horn of Africa (Nairobi)** 10-12 January 1997  
Sponsor: CRS Sudan  
Trainers: Mary B. Anderson, Wolfgang Heinrich
4. **Canada (Ottawa)** 21-22 January 1997  
Sponsor: CARE Canada / LCPP  
Trainers: Mary B. Anderson, Greg Hansen
5. **Denmark** (DanChurchAid) 28-29 January 1997  
Trainer: Mary B. Anderson
6. **Bosnia (Sarajevo)** 10-12 February 1997  
Sponsor: CRS  
Trainers: Mary B. Anderson, Sam Engelstad, Janis Lindsteadt
7. **Croatia (Zagreb)** 13-15 February 1997  
Sponsor: CRS  
Trainers: Janis Lindsteadt, Sam Engelstad
8. **TransCaucasus (Godouri, Georgia)**  
18-20 February 1997  
Sponsor: OXFAM UK  
Trainers: Kenny Gluck, Greg Hansen
9. **North Caucasus (Nazran, Ingushetia)**  
25-27 February 1997  
Sponsor: Merlin / UNHCR  
Trainers: Greg Hansen, Kenny Gluck
10. **India (Ahmedabad)** 12-14 March 1997  
Sponsor: St. Xavier's Social Service Society  
Trainers: Greg Hansen, Pia Jertfelt, Joe Bock
11. **Norway (Oslo)** 18-19 March, 1997  
Trainer: Mary B. Anderson
12. **Cambodia** 19-21 March 1997  
Sponsor: UNDP / CARE  
Trainers: Sam Engelstad, Joergen Kristensen
13. **Denmark** 20 March 1997  
Sponsor: DanChurchAid  
Trainer: Mary B. Anderson
14. **USA** April 2 1997  
Oxfam America (in-house)  
Trainer: Mary B. Anderson
- 15/16. **Rwanda (Kigali)**  
(1) 28-30 April 1997 (English)  
(2) 5-7 May 1997 (French)  
Sponsor: World Vision  
Trainers: Mary B. Anderson, Willet Weeks
17. **Guatemala** June 12 1997  
(CRS in-house)  
Trainer: Kenny Gluck
18. **Germany (Bonn)** June 12-14 1997  
Sponsor: EZE  
Trainers: Mary B. Anderson, Greg Hansen
19. **Sri Lanka** June 17-19 1997  
Sponsor: CARE / NGO Consortium / RRAN  
Trainers: Greg Hansen, Sam Engelstad
20. **Haiti** June 16-18 1997  
Sponsor: Canada-Haiti Humanitarian Alliance  
Trainers: Stephen Jackson, Laura Frost, Janis Lindsteadt
21. **Guatemala** June 24-26 1997 (Spanish)  
Sponsor: Radda Barna  
Trainers: Kenny Gluck, Inger Bjork
22. **Colombia** July 1-3 1997 (Spanish)  
Sponsor: Swedish Red Cross  
Trainers: Inger Bjork, Kenny Gluck
23. **Angola** (June)  
Sponsor: CRS  
Trainers: Per Midteide, Wolfgang Heinrich

## Implementation: Phase III of the Do No Harm Project

Twelve organizations tested the Do No Harm Framework in the field. They used it in their planning, their monitoring, their evaluation, and in their redesign of programmes.

## Mainstreaming

During the official mainstreaming year of 2001, over 100 agencies participated in developing strategies for taking up the Do No Harm concepts and making use of the Framework in their work.



(This paper was originally published in *Development in Practice*, Vol. 12, Nos.3 & 4, August 2002. It has been slightly altered here for use in this context.)

## The Learning Process of the Local Capacities for Peace Project

Marshall Wallace

(*DiP*, V.12, 3&4, August 2002)

### **Where does the Local Capacities for Peace Project (LCPP) come from?**

The changing world in the wake of the Cold War altered the circumstances where humanitarian and development agencies work. Violent conflicts surfaced in many countries—conflicts that the international powers did not or would not support or mediate. The roles of humanitarian agencies began to shift. Aid agencies either identified new roles for themselves or were asked by their donors to take on functions they had not previously filled.

The new circumstances propelled aid workers into situations of increasing danger that affected them, their projects and the beneficiaries of aid. It became increasingly apparent that aid given in a context of conflict is itself a part of that context. This is simply unavoidable. Further, it was clear that the way in which aid is given can, under some circumstances, have exacerbating effects on the conflict.

Aid's negative effects are inadvertent and unintentional, but that does not lessen the need to avoid them. Rather, it sends a call to all our colleagues to be aware of these effects and to do our work in such a way as to minimize them—to “do no harm”. It is also possible in some cases to give aid in a way that can help mitigate violence and provide the people involved in the conflict with the space—the breathing room—to build their peace.

If aid is found to support a war effort, should aid agencies and practitioners continue to give it? The resounding answer given by aid workers all over the world is that the needs of suffering people are too important to ignore and, further, that there can be no justification for not assisting suffering people. Inevitably, the next question is: How can one give aid in the context of conflict without exacerbating the conflict?

The Local Capacities for Peace Project (LCPP) was formed in 1994 to address this concern of aid workers. If aid becomes a part of the context, how does this happen? The LCPP was organized to learn how aid and conflict interact in order to help aid workers find a way to address human needs in a conflict without feeding conflict.

### **What does this paper do?**

This paper will not repeat the lessons learned through the LCPP in any depth. Those have been amply detailed elsewhere.<sup>1</sup> Rather, this paper will discuss the processes and approaches of the

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<sup>1</sup> Mary B. Anderson has written numerous pieces on the lessons learned by LCPP. See the References for some examples, as well as the web site for the Collaborative for Development Action, Inc. (CDA), available at <http://www.cdainc.com>.

LCPP. It will show how the methodology of LCPP was designed to address an issue of serious concern to aid practitioners and to generate lessons based on experience that could be translated into a practical and useable tool to improve the impacts of aid programming.

This paper will discuss how the learning process of the LCPP was designed and the results gained at each step. It will also discuss how the results were fed back to the participating organizations.

### **Inductive process of the LCPP**

The LCPP was designed to gather its results inductively, working from the experience of people in the field toward a general application of the lessons. Why use an inductive process? What are its advantages and what can be learned by using this approach?

The inductive process is engaging. It starts where people are, with their daily experiences, their dilemmas and their observations. The inductive process is cumulative. It proceeds from the particular to the general by taking many individual experiences and comparing them in the search for patterns. The inductive process is wide-ranging and realist. It accepts the validity of everyone's experiences and follows where these lead. The inductive process is pragmatic. As patterns are found, lessons can be learned about options for action available in similar situations.

Furthermore, for humanitarians there is an additional reason to use an inductive learning process. Humanitarian work has a direct impact on the quality of people's lives. It is, therefore, essential to base a learning process intended to improve humanitarian work on people's actual lives and actual experiences.

How did the LCPP use an inductive process? The LCPP involved four phases. The first phase gathered information about the relationships between aid programs and conflict. The experiences were written up as case studies. The second phase added to the learning through "feedback workshops" where the experiences gathered through the case studies were shared with aid practitioners in a variety of venues. In these workshops, participants added their experiences and insights to the project through their confirmations and challenges of the lessons from the case studies. In the course of the second phase a practical tool in the form of a framework for understanding and predicting the relations between aid and conflict was developed. The third phase focused on implementation of the lessons learned and the application of the framework at the field level in ongoing projects in conflict situations. Field staff used the framework tool to analyze their project impacts on the conflicts where they worked. Twice yearly consultations with representatives from all of the project sites supported the generalization of lessons learned by specific projects. The fourth and current phase is mainstreaming the lessons and approaches of the LCPP in a number of participating organizations. Each of the four stages has contributed to understanding the issues and to learning how to improve humanitarian work. In the following pages each phase is described in more detail.

### **Experience-Based Learning Phase I: Case Studies (1994-1996)**

In order to learn about the interaction of aid in conflict, it was necessary to gather a starting set of information and to see if there were common experiences among aid practitioners. The LCPP began by looking at the activities and projects of fifteen aid agencies in fourteen conflict zones and by writing these stories into case studies. The case studies covered a wide range of agencies and types of intervention, as well as a number of different regions of the world and types of conflict in the expectation that broad inclusion is necessary for generalizable learning.<sup>2</sup>

The case study writers were people in the aid community who had expressed concerns about aid in the context of conflict and wanted to learn more about how aid interacts with conflict. Some wrote about their own experiences or the experience of their organization; others were “outsiders” to the project they examined. Case writers were charged with a straightforward task. They were asked, first, to describe the context of the conflict; second, to describe the aid intervention; and, third, to describe the interactions between the conflict and the aid. Finally, they were asked to discuss why what happened from their perspective, as well as from the points of view of people in the field (aid workers, beneficiaries and others).

The case study writers traveled to the locations of their cases. They had extensive conversations with the aid practitioners on the ground, both expatriate and local staff. They talked with people who were beneficiaries of the project and with people who were not directly benefited. The case study writers did not work with pre-set interview protocols or questionnaires. They engaged people in telling their own stories in their own ways.

The organizations about whom the case studies were written were involved in the LCPP through a number of different avenues. In some cases, they were asked by their donors to participate. In others, the headquarters either suggested a field site or were lobbied by their staff in the field for inclusion. All were motivated by the shared concern about the interactions of aid with conflict. They were willing to risk “exposure” in the expectation that the learning gathered would be of practical use. Encouraging as many organizations to join the project as possible ensured that the ownership was broadly spread and that the learning was representative.

Case studies take a snapshot of experience. Putting a series of snapshots side by side allows common themes and patterns to appear. It also allows the identification of contextual differences. Distilling the commonalities and the particularities is the challenge to learning from case studies. LCPP convened groups to read and analyze the cases. These groups consisted of the case writers, people from the war zones where the cases had been written, and other aid practitioners. They began the process of sorting the information for its practical application.

Enough patterns about aid’s impact on conflict situations were identified that it was agreed to produce a booklet for broader consideration. The booklet, *Do No Harm: Supporting Local Capacities for Peace through Aid*, was conceived as a work-in-progress and invited readers to contact the LCPP “with your own ideas and insights so these can be incorporated into the lessons learned to be widely shared among the assistance community at work in conflict settings.”

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<sup>2</sup> The case studies were written about fifteen projects in fourteen conflict zones. The conflict areas included Bosnia, Burundi, Guatemala, Lebanon, Somalia and Tajikistan. For a complete list and the text of some of the cases, please refer to the web site of CDA.

(Anderson 1996: i)<sup>3</sup> It was recognized that the case studies were not sufficient in and of themselves to provide much more than a starting point, identifying some common themes. While the cases had amply confirmed the fact of aid's interaction with conflict, they had barely begun to chart the mechanisms involved in how these interactions take place.

### **Experience-Based Learning Phase II: Feedback Workshops (1996-1998)**

Accepting its own challenge as put forth in the booklet, LCPP set out to involve many more people in testing and adding to what had been learned through the case studies. "Feedback" workshops were used to introduce more people and all of their experiences into the mix. These workshops were arranged in collaboration with aid agency personnel in the field and at headquarters. Over an eighteen-month period, over 25 feedback workshops were run in 20 locations. Most of these were in regions of conflict, including some in the locations where case studies had been written. Others were held in agency headquarters in European and North American cities.

LCPP recruited and trained a cadre of workshop facilitators. Some of these were staff of aid agencies whose time was donated to this effort. All the facilitators had had grounded experience in humanitarian or development assistance. The facilitators, along with LCPP staff, put together a manual for trainers. This manual was designed for use by aid agencies in their own internal training programs so that the process could continue beyond the availability of the cadre of LCPP trainers.

Feedback workshops usually lasted three days and included a series of sessions designed to elicit participants' own experiences of working with aid in conflict situations. Participants were asked to challenge and to support, to add to and to amend the learning from the cases. The facilitators led the sessions and gathered the results of the discussions, feeding them back into the LCPP learning process.

This phase of LCPP's inductive process directly involved over 750 additional aid practitioners from about 100 agencies in generating ideas and insights. One or two organizations hosted each workshop, but all agencies in the area were invited to participate and to send someone to share their own and that agency's experiences. People in the workshops often told LCPP that these events gave them a rare opportunity to step away from their daily work and, with colleagues from other agencies, to consider the impacts that their aid was having. They often found that the sharing of these ideas led to creative options for some of the difficulties they were encountering.

Engaging this wide range of people with their broad variety of experience assured that the learning was both grounded in the complexity of real life and relevant across many circumstances. Introducing these additional people into LCPP through the feedback workshops was equivalent in some ways to adding an additional 750 case studies (or more, because many of the participants had experience of providing aid in multiple conflict areas). This testing of and

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<sup>3</sup> This booklet, the first titled 'Do No Harm', is superseded by the 1999 publication. CDA does not "stand behind" this booklet, as it never represented a final document. If you possess a copy, CDA requests that you recycle it. Do not use it as a reference. Quotes from this work in progress have led to many misunderstandings about the nature of LCPP.

adding to the patterns and commonalities identified by the case studies focused and improved the quality of the learning.

Involving more people and agencies in the learning process also ensured that the ownership of the ideas would be more widely disseminated. It was never anticipated that the findings of the LCPP would “belong” solely to the project. It was intended from the beginning that aid agencies and practitioners would take up whatever information was generated by the project. The feedback workshops were a part of the process of spreading and increasing ownership through the dissemination of ideas and also the challenging of those ideas. At the end of every workshop, the learning of the project was greater than before.

At the end of the feedback workshop phase, LCPP was able to produce a workable and generalizable tool for analyzing the impacts of aid on conflict. The “Do No Harm Framework” came from the people participating in the workshops, as together they applied their wide range of experience to the issue. In order to further the spread of the knowledge gained by the project, LCPP produced a book detailing the Framework tool.<sup>4</sup>

The feedback workshops transformed the emerging patterns from the information in the case studies into a general and common framework of knowledge for understanding the impacts that aid projects can have on conflict. As useful and necessary a step as this was, the challenge remained to take these general lessons and apply them to particular situations. If the patterns identified and confirmed through the first two phases of LCPP were, in fact, relevant for aid practitioners, they needed to be translatable into a form that was practical for use in the daily activities of aid workers.

### **Experience-Based Learning Phase III: Implementation (1998-2000)**

LCPP is about aid agencies doing their work better. The third phase of the project set out to apply the knowledge gained through the first two phases. LCPP proposed implementing the “Do No Harm Framework” in actual field sites. The purpose of this effort was to demonstrate the utility of the Framework to inform and improve the day-to-day decisions made by project staff in difficult situations around the world.

Fourteen agencies collaborated directly with LCPP in testing the usefulness and practicality of the Framework. They used it in their project design, implementation, monitoring, evaluation and redesign. In order to ensure that everybody involved in a project was working from a common understanding, training sessions in the material and the use of the Framework were held. Many of the agencies included local staff and the staff of local partner organizations in this training.

The projects were selected in a variety of different ways. In some of the organizations, the headquarters picked a project to implement the Framework and requested that the team in the field make themselves available to participate in the LCPP. Some of the projects were picked by people who were themselves running projects and had heard about or been exposed to the LCPP and found it interesting and worthwhile to attempt to apply it to their own projects.

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<sup>4</sup> For an introduction to the Do No Harm Framework for Analyzing the Impact of Aid on Conflict please refer to Chapter 6 of *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace—Or War*

LCPP's role was to provide a "liaison" for each project. The role of the liaison was, first, to run training sessions on the lessons learned for the people at the project site. Second, the liaison served as an advisor on how to use the Framework and helped to focus the discussions. Third, the liaison was responsible for returning to the project site every three months to perform additional facilitating or training as needed, and to keep the approach in the forefront of the project team's minds. And, fourth, the liaison was responsible for documenting the learning and feeding the experience gathered back into the project.

In addition to supporting the liaison work at the project sites, the LCPP convened twice-yearly consultations. These consultations gathered the liaisons together with people participating in the projects from the field, as well as people from the headquarters of the agencies involved and even including some donors. Participants shared their experiences of using the Framework. The most interesting discussions involved using the whole group to generate ideas and options to deal with the difficulties faced by a particular project.

The implementation phase covered a full three years. It was felt that three years was the minimum time to be able to assess the impacts of the use of the tool. Three years were sufficient to establish some indications about aid's impacts on conflict and to identify the *significant* impacts on conflict of six major types of decisions made by aid projects.<sup>5</sup> A manual was produced discussing the impact of these decisions and several options for aid projects.

Implementation served as a test for the tool produced from the two preceding phases. Implementation also generated a new set of experiences that added to and tested the learning. Furthermore, it provided a way to check on the knowledge gained and the lessons learned in the previous two phases of the project.

The implementation took the general and common lessons and provided the opportunity to use those lessons in a particular place to achieve a particular result. The learning process, in some sense, came around in a full circle, though it did not cease. Several hundred more aid practitioners were involved in the implementation phase of LCPP. They too challenged, tested, and added to the learning. The continuing addition of people exposed to LCPP and involving them in refining the tool, as well as adding to its basis, further spread the ownership of these ideas among the aid community.

### **The Power of the Learning Process of LCPP as Embodied in the Framework**

The "Do No Harm Framework" is an evolving tool. While its overall structure has remained the same since it was first developed out of the Feedback Workshops, using it in the field has furthered the refinement of the details which the Framework can emphasize. Also, several agencies have adapted it in order to better integrate it into their own procedures. This constant

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<sup>5</sup> The six major types of decisions faced by aid agencies are detailed in Section 2 through Section 7 of *Options for Aid in Conflict*. Briefly, they are decisions about who should receive aid, decisions about staffing of field programmes, decisions about local partners, decisions about what to provide, decisions about how to provide aid, and decisions about working with local authorities.

testing under practical conditions continues and continues to push the development and usefulness of the tool.

The experience of using the Framework has allowed agencies to map the interactions of their aid with contexts of conflict. It has also offered three interrelated benefits.

First, it helps aid workers to develop specific criteria for making decisions and to be able to articulate clearly the reasons for those decisions in a manner that can be shared easily. Field staff are responsible for making good decisions and they often need to be able to explain these decisions to their headquarters and/or donors and also to the local communities. In situations of uncertainty, where levels of fear and distrust are high, being able to communicate clearly and transparently can greatly improve the ability to do the work well.

Second, the Framework encourages a rigorous emphasis on the facts. This leads agencies to make their implicit decisions explicit and helps to prevent misguided assumptions. It also encourages agencies to rely on the knowledge of their local staff. Several agencies have commented that involving the local staff in the LCPP sessions has led to greater understanding of the context for all involved as well as steering the programming into clearer directions.

Third, the Framework supports a continuous critical inquiry into the way in which agencies do their work. Agencies have reported that in using the Framework they can more clearly see their actual impacts and can, therefore, make informed decisions, rather than making decisions based upon an assumed impact. Organizations want to do their work well and the Framework encourages an honest appraisal of good work. Many agencies have reported uncovering “honest mistakes” on their part which has led them to change their programming procedures to avoid such pitfalls in the future.

#### **Experience-Based Learning Phase IV: Mainstreaming (2001)**

Three related issues were raised in the consultations that encouraged the continuation of LCPP into a fourth phase. All three concerned the interactions of work in the field with responses of headquarters and donors.

The first issue was a difficulty raised by the staff working in the field with the Framework. They found that donor policies and agency headquarters policies could themselves have an exacerbating influence on conflict. This led to a paper produced by LCPP about the responsibilities of donors and headquarters staff when dealing with projects in conflict situations.<sup>6</sup>

The second issue was also a concern raised by field staff. They found that donors and headquarters often had attitudes and policies that hampered the uptake of the Do No Framework by field staff—even if the field staff were interested in doing so. This concern was also expressed in a broader fashion, encompassing a general concern by field staff about the influence of donors and headquarters on the uptake of any new idea or method.

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<sup>6</sup> See ‘The Implications of Do No Harm for Donors and Aid Agency Headquarters’.

The third issue sprang from the acknowledgement by the headquarters of the agencies of their influence on the uptake of ideas. Headquarters staff were interested in spreading the concepts of LCPP throughout their organizations. The implementation efforts had succeeded in imparting the lessons learned by LCPP to date to the staff directly involved in a particular field site. However, the organizations themselves had not been sufficiently exposed to the broad learning in a way that the Framework could be taken up in other areas. This was expressed in a broader fashion as well, concerning the ways in which humanitarian agencies as a whole learn and implement new ideas and methods.

A fourth phase of LCPP was proposed to address these three concerns. It was decided to focus on the third of these issues, the issue of organizational learning, and to address the other two as adjunct to this process. This fourth phase of LCPP was named the “mainstreaming” phase in order to reflect the concern with bringing LCPP to the mainstream of humanitarian practice.

The purpose of this phase was conceived of in two ways. By exposing more people to the Framework, the knowledge base of LCPP could again be extended and expanded through involving more people throughout the aid community. In addition, LCPP would use the Framework as a test case to learn about organizational learning in humanitarian agencies.

The agencies involved looked upon this as an opportunity to increase the integration of the Framework tool into their operational procedures. Where the third phase of LCPP had in large part limited the use of the Framework to one field project, the mainstreaming phase would engage a wider range of agency staff, including both the field and the headquarters. It was remarked that this process would put the field and the headquarters “on the same page”.

How an organization establishes these linkages within itself to promote the uptake of an idea or a tool—and the implementation of the tool into operations—was also seen as a desired outcome by the agencies. A varied approach was undertaken to answer this question. LCPP began a wide-ranging discussion with agencies about how to proceed. Agencies were encouraged to think about their own strategies for mainstreaming other ideas (e.g. gender, the environment, the use of computers). This prior experience informed the strategies that agencies could use in the course of the fourth phase of LCPP.

Each agency involved identified its own way to proceed. These varied quite a bit, depending on a number of factors including agency size, partnering strategies, and types of field activity. LCPP offered support to the agencies through conversations about prior and current strategies. LCPP also offered continuing training, but in this phase with an emphasis on integrating the training into an organization-wide strategy.

All of the strategies identified and utilized by agencies built upon existing linkages between people in the field and the headquarters staff. These relationships vary from agency to agency on a range of issues such as differing perspectives on autonomy and direction, policy and implementation, and impact of donor decisions.

The mainstreaming phase was scheduled to last for a single year. It was understood by LCPP and the agencies that one-year is not sufficient to mainstream an idea. However, one year was



felt to be enough to begin the mainstreaming process and to learn important lessons about how humanitarian organizations learn and implement their learning.

Again, consultations were scheduled to be held twice in the year to gather the experience of the agencies involved. The second of these was held at the end of November 2001.

### **An Additional Note on the Consultations**

The consultations have been found to be among the most important parts of the process. They have provided a supportive setting to discuss the issues that were being raised on the ground. The wide range of experience of the participants encouraged the flow of ideas and facilitated problem solving.

Agencies brought their problems working in contexts of conflict to the consultations and the group was always able to generate some options. Agencies also brought their solutions and these would be soon be tested at other project sites. The consultations always had an emphasis on the refinement of the learning and allowed for the constant practice of using the methodology.

The consultations also provided a forum for developing and deepening professional relationships. Information and techniques continue to be disseminated among the people who participated in the consultations.

### **Summary**

The learning process of the LCPP demonstrates four things. First, it demonstrates how a large amount of experience can be gathered in a fairly short period of time. Second, it shows how that experience and data can be transformed into a useful and practical tool. Third, it shows how such a process can be designed to increase and refine learning over time, while also leading to actions that improve project impacts. And fourth, it shows how a process can be organized to engage many people to increase ownership of the learning process, and, therefore, the use of the lessons once learned.

Case studies are limited—only so many can be written, and this limited set of information seldom leads to an acceptable platform for practical response to the issues raised. Cases can serve to establish the existence of common, general themes across a range of specific experience. However, in order to develop practical responses to the lessons outlined in case studies, it is necessary to take further steps.

Once a series of experiences has been gathered, in this case through case studies, it is equally important to involve as many people as possible into the process of culling the lessons from those experiences. There is a continuing responsibility to involve as much experience as possible in the project. Engaging people upon an issue that they have identified as important ensures that the project will benefit from this experience. It also ensures that the outcomes will be relevant to the experience of the people involved.

Implementing the findings tests their operational practicality. The process of putting something into practice reveals the limitations and the strengths of the prior learning. The practical application of the lessons highlights concerns and demonstrates where the project can have an immediate impact. It also highlights those places where more work needs to be done in the project. Furthermore, implementation involves another set of people in the process and the project continues to learn from the experience of these people.

The aid field has a vast number of highly intelligent and thoughtful people who are involved in discussions about how to work better. Engaging these people can only improve the quality of all our work. The challenges that people bring to bear on an issue from their own experience open up great possibilities for learning and for acting.<sup>7</sup>

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## References

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<sup>7</sup> The funding of LCPP was a two-part process. Funds came from both regular donors and from the involved agencies.

LCPP was funded by a wide number of the donor governments and agencies. This was by design. It encouraged the agencies from those countries to be involved, which also spread the knowledge around the world. Further, the information and lessons coming out of LCPP could not be seen as belonging to one country or reflective of one country’s experience. Spreading the funding over a wide number of donors encouraged a wide sense of ownership.

It was also understood that donors give more than money. Their encouragement of a project can increase the involvement of NGOs. LCPP also encouraged donors to take an active part in the project through participation in the consultations and some work in the field. Some of the donors have done so in the course of LCPP. These additional elements increase the ownership of the project and its results by the donor, as well as providing valuable insights throughout the process.

The agencies involved in LCPP were encouraged to offer some of the time of their staff as in-kind payments. The project estimates that 30% of the budget of LCPP has come from donations from agencies, both cash and in-kind.

For a list of donors please refer to the web site of CDA.